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CIVIL PROCEDURE IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT:




A review of the decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit in 1979-80 on the subject of civil procedure reveals
several cases of interest and importance, although few of them are
likely to gain national significance.' A review also reveals the skillful
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State's Attorney, Cook County.
** Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School; J.D., University of Chicago.
The authors express their appreciation to Reid Jacobson, a research assistant at The John
Marshall Law School, for his assistance.
I. The bulk of the cases decided between June I, 1979 and May 31, 1980 in the area of civil
procedure were routine in nature, and therefore will not be discussed in this article. Among the
cases reported were:
FED. R. Civ. P. 24: Heyman v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 615 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1980);
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hanrahan, 612 F.2d 1051 (7th Cir. 1980).
FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b): Bank of Lincolnwood v. Federal Leasing, Inc., 622 F.2d 944 (7th
Cir. 1980).
FED. R. Civ. P. 56: Agustin v. Quern, 611 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1979); First Nat'l Bank Co.
v. Insurance Co., 606 F.2d 760 (7th Cir. 1979); Cedillo v. International Ass'n of Bridge &
Structural Iron Workers, 603 F.2d 7 (7th Cir. 1979); County of Milwaukee v. Northrop
Data Systems, Inc., 602 F.2d 767 (7th Cir. 1979).
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b): United States v. Walus, 616 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1980); Fuhrman v.
Livaditis, 611 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1979); Pacurar v. Hernly, 611 F.2d 179 (7th Cir. 1979);
Bradford Exch. v. Trein's Exch., 600 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1979).
ILLINOIS STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS: Perkins v. Hendrickson Mfg. Co., 610 F.2d 469 (7th
Cir. 1979).
JUDGMENT N.O.V.: Lykos v. American Home Ins. Co., 609 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1979).
JURISDICTION: Neiman v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 619 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1980) (Illinois
Long Arm Statute); Wisconsin Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Pennant Prods., Inc., 619 F.2d 676 (7th
Cir. 1980) (in personam); Rice v. Rice Foundation, 610 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1979) (subject
matter).
JURY: United States v. One 1976 Mercedes Benz 280S, 618 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1980)
(demand for jury trial); Matthews v. Ernst Russ S.S. Co., 603 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1979)
(jury instructions).
COUNTERCLAIMS: National Acceptance Co. of America v. Coal Producers Ass'n, Inc.,
604 F.2d 540 (7th Cir. 1979).
DIRECTED VERDICT: Merit Ins. Co. v. Colao, 603 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1979).
PLEADINGS: Shashoua v. Quern, 612 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1979).
MANDAMUS: General Elec. Co. v. Byrne, 611 F.2d 670 (7th Cir. 1979).
JUSTICIABILITY: Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Roan, 617 F.2d 1217 (7th
Cir. 1980) (standing); Koehring Co. v. Adams, 605 F.2d 280 (7th Cir. 1979) (ripeness);
Brown v. Scott, 602 F.2d 791 (7th Cir. 1979) (standing).
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION: American Dairy Queen Corp. v. Brown-Port Co., 621 F.2d
255 (7th Cir. 1980).
MISCELLANEOUS: Dual Mfg. & Eng'r., Inc. v. Burris Indus., Inc., 619 F.2d 660 (7th Cir.
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treatment given such cases by the judges of the Seventh Circuit. This
article will review cases involving personal jurisdiction, 2 subject matter
jurisdiction, 3 compulsory counterclaims,4 discovery 5 and trial.6 Gener-
ally, the cases are well reasoned and reach the proper result. 7 For the
most part, the decisions show a pragmatic but sensitive balancing of
competing interests between individuals and government, and among
governments.
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
The traditional notion of jurisdiction over a person is physical
presence. 8 It requires that the defendant be served with process within
the forum state's boundaries in in personam actions. The notion of
physical presence, however, failed to satisfy the pragmatic needs of a
modern, mobile society.9 It gave way formally in International Shoe v.
1980) (failure to object to jury instruction as bar to later challenge); Utz v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 7 (7th Cir. 1980) (joinder of insurance company as defendant
under Wisconsin Direct Action Statute); United States ex rel. Davidson v. Wilkinson,
618 F.2d 114 (7th Cir. 1980) (review of habeas corpus proceeding under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253); Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 617 F.2d 460 (7th Cir. 1980) (jury award of
damages as bar to subsequent claim for equitable relief which could have been brought
in prior adjudication); Ruderer v. Fines, 614 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1980) (damage for frivo-
lous appeal); American Civil Liberties Union v. Brown, 609 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1979)
(review of district court order denying defendant state secrets privilege); Daniels v. Mc-
Kay Machine Co., 607 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1979) (state court denial of summary judgment:
effect on federal court posture after removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1450); Panko v. Rodak,
606 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1979) (mandamus directing clerk to file petition for certiorari
where petition failed to comply with Supreme Court Rule 39); Wisconsin Packing Co. v.
Indiana Refrig. Lines, Inc., 604 F.2d 1022 (7th Cir. 1979) (sufficiency of notice of claim
under Interstate Commerce Act); LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Rosewell, 604 F.2d 530 (7th Cir.
1979) (Federal Tax Injunction Act as bar to district court jurisdiction over § 1983 civil
rights action); Judd v. First Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 599 F.2d 820 (7th Cir. 1979) (denial of
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) motion on notice not reviewable as final order under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291).
2. Biltmoor Moving & Storage Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 606 F.2d 202 (7th Cir. 1979).
3. Oswald v. McGarr, 620 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1980): Waste Management of Wisc., Inc. v.
Fokakis, 614 F.2d 138 (7th Cir. 1980); City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604
F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979); Hill v. Jenkins, 603 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1979); Muhich v. Allen, 603 F.2d
1247 (7th Cir. 1979).
4. Valencia v. Anderson Bros. Ford, 617 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1980).
5. Socialist Workers Party v. Grubisic, 619 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1980); In re Folding Carton
Antitrust Litigation, 609 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Balistrieri, 606 F.2d 216 (7th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1850 (1980).
6. Fietzer v. Ford Motor Co., 622 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1980); Muscare v. Quinn, 614 F.2d 577
(7th Cir. 1980); United States v. D'Andrea, 612 F.2d 1386 (7th Cir. 1980); August v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 600 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1979).
7. Unless otherwise noted, the authors concur in the reasoning and result in each of the
cases discussed.
8. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
9. Dambach, Personal Jurisdiction: Some Current Problems and Modern Trends, 5 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 198, 198-99 (1957).
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Washington '0 to the "minimum contacts" doctrine as an alternative ba-
sis of jurisdiction over the person. The minimum contacts doctrine al-
lows service of process beyond the forum state's boundaries if the
defendant by his conduct purposefully avails himself of benefits of the
forum state and if the forum is a fair and convenient place to litigate
the claim. In tort cases, the necessary minimum contacts are estab-
lished often by the occurrence of damages within the forum." Actual
physical presence within the forum is not a requisite to jurisdiction if
tortious conduct outside the forum caused damages within it. 12 In
breach of contract cases, minimum contacts are established often by the
occurrence of any part of the negotiations, through the stage resulting
in damages, within the forum state. 13 Nonetheless, the complexity of
transactions at times results in the inability of a forum state to assert
jurisdiction over the person of all parties. 14 In such situations the need
for a single, fair and convenient forum may affect the decision as to the
degree of contacts required to satisfy the minimum contacts doctrine.
Application of the Illinois Long Arm Statute1 5 was the concern in
Biltmoor Moving & Storage Co. v. Shell Oil Co. 16 The defendant Shell
Oil Co., a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in
Houston, Texas, decided to relocate certain of its offices and laborato-
ries, including those facilities located in Wood River, Illinois, to Hous-
ton. To this end, Shell contracted with the defendant Great Southwest
Warehouses, Inc., 17 a Texas corporation conducting a moving and stor-
age business and having its principal place of business in Houston, to
perform the services necessary to consummate the relocation. GSW
subcontracted the relocation of the Wood River facilities to the plain-
tiff, Biltmoor Moving & Storage, a Missouri corporation having its
principal place of business in St. Louis, and such subcontracting was
expressly recognized and authorized by the Shell-GSW agreement.
18
10. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
1I. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761
(1961).
12. Thill Sec. Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 283 F. Supp. 239 (E.D. Wis. 1968); O'Donnell
Chevrolet, Inc. v. Shankles, 276 F. Supp. 998 (N.D. Il. 1967).
13. Scoville Mfg. Co. v. Dateline Elec. Co., 461 F.2d 897 (7th Cir. 1972).
14. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
15. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (1979), which provides in relevant part:
(I) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in person or
through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits such
person ... to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising
from the doing of any such acts:
(a) The transaction of any business within this State; . ...
16. 606 F.2d 202 (7th Cir. 1979).
17. Hereinafter referred to as GSW.
18. 606 F.2d at 204-05.
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An agent of Biltmoor, GSW, and Shell met at the Wood River site
on one day only. During this meeting, the parties discussed the
mechanics and procedures for the move of the Wood River facilities.
Biltmoor performed the moving functions at the Wood River site
for a period of about eight months and was paid $144,948.79 by GSW.
Biltmoor, however, claimed that it was owed an additional $327,347.42
which both GSW and Shell refused to pay.
Biltmoor filed suit against GSW and Shell in the federal district
court in Missouri, but that court dismissed the case for lack of personal
jurisdiction over GSW. 19 The district court concluded that the
Biltmoor-GSW contract was formed in Texas, that none of the con-
tracts had any contacts with Missouri sufficient to confer jurisdiction on
the court under the Missouri Long Arm Statute, and that all of the
contacts were in Illinois. 20 Shell was dismissed for failure to obtain
jurisdiction over GSW, an indispensable party. 2'
Biltmoor then filed suit against GSW and Shell in the federal dis-
trict court in Illinois. Again, the suit was dismissed because the parties
had not transacted business in Illinois and could not be reached under
the Illinois Long Arm Statute. 22 The two important reasons for this
conclusion by the district court were that Biltmoor was not an Illinois
resident and that the agent of GSW spent only part of one day at the
Wood River site in Illinois.23 Shell was dismissed due to the failure of
Biltmoor to obtain jurisdiction over an indispensable party.
24
Because Illinois case law had interpreted the Illinois Long Arm
Statute to extend jurisdiction over non-residents to the fullest extent
allowed by due process of law, 25 the question on appeal to the Seventh
Circuit was whether extending such jurisdiction to GSW and Shell
would protect them under due process standards. The Seventh Circuit
held that there was jurisdiction over GSW and Shell, and reversed and
remanded the case for trial.
26
The Seventh Circuit began its analysis by citing to International
Shoe 27 for the proposition that "a state's jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation depends upon the existence of such contact 'as makes it
19. Id at 205.
20. Id
21. Id at 206.
22. Id at 205.
23. Id
24. Id at 206.
25. See Nelson v. Miller, I I I11. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
26. 606 F.2d at 208.
27. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government, to re-
quire the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought
there.' "28 Finding sufficient contacts with Illinois to justify jurisdiction
over Shell was an easy matter. Shell was conducting business by oper-
ating its facilities at Wood River. Furthermore, the contract with GSW
provided that Shell's staff was to perform much of the packing work at
the Wood River Laboratory and that Shell's staff was to train and
maintain liaison with the moving contractor's supervisor. 29 With re-
spect to the contacts of GSW with Illinois, the Seventh Circuit again
emphasized the provisions of the contract:
The primary Shell-GSW contract provided that despite the appoint-
ment of subcontractors, GSW as contractor retained complete re-
sponsibility to Shell for the Wood River project; GSW indemnified
Shell for all loss or damage at Wood River; GSW maintained insur-
ance of all kinds relating to the Wood River project; and GSW was
required to take all necessary safety precautions at Wood River.
30
GSW took the position that it had insufficient contact with Illinois
because its agent spent less than one day in the state. The court, how-
ever, rejected this position, saying:
This fact does not detract from the more important fact that GSW
was primarily responsible for the performance of a contract that took
more than eight months (presumably all or most of which in Illinois)
to perform. In other words, the moving contract absolutely required
substantial and lengthy performance within Illinois by Shell, GSW
and Biltmoor.
31
The court emphasized the distinction between the present case and
a case where the contract allows the plaintiff the opportunity to deter-
mine in which state to perform. As the court pointed out, in the latter
case, ". . . we have recently held that where the contract between the
parties left the plaintiff in absolute control over where it could conduct
the contractually required activity and where the plaintiff unilaterally
decided to conduct that activity in the forum state, performance of the
contract in the forum state did not give the forum jurisdiction over the
defendant." 32 The contract in this case, however, "absolutely required
28. 606 F.2d at 206, quoting 326 U.S. at 316-17.
29. 606 F.2d at 206.
30. Id. at 206-07.
3 1. Id. at 207.
32. Id at 206, referring to Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 597
F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979). After citing several Illinois cases, the court wrote that "Illinois courts
have not always distinguished between situations where the contract requires performance in Illi-
nois and situations where, although the contract is silent, the defendant knows in advance that
performance will take place in Illinois." 606 F.2d at 207. See also Gallagher, Civil Procedure.
Access to the District Courts, Suitability ofthe Forum, and Appellate Jurisdiction and Procedure, 56
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 103, 127 (1980) [hereinafter cited as GALLAGHER].
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performance in Illinois. '33 Finally, the court noted that ". . . it would
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice if Shell,
busily engaged in business in Illinois, could obtain lengthy services in
Illinois from Biltmoor and then escape from Illinois by interposing a
contractual intermediary between itself and Biltmoor. ' ' 34 Therefore,
the court held that there was jurisdiction over GSW and Shell under
the Illinois Long Arm Statute.
35
Biltmoor exemplifies a common recurring problem in today's com-
mercial world. Multiple corporations engage in multi-state transac-
tions. Rules of jurisdiction (and joinder) often seem rigid and artificial
when applied to the practical commercial expectations of those transac-
tions. GSW apparently experienced little difficulty in engaging
Biltmoor to handle Shell's move. Yet it apparently anticipated great
difficulty in litigating a dispute stemming from that move in federal
court in either Missouri or Illinois. It obviously wished to litigate the
dispute, if at all, in Texas, the only other available forum under either
physical presence or minimum contacts. Yet under the facts, Illinois
was as fair and convenient a forum as Texas, the federal tribunal was
undoubtedly as impartial in Illinois as in Texas, and the parties to the
transactions could expect one would choose Illinois as a forum to liti-
gate disputes stemming from the transactions. Although the Seventh
Circuit focused on the single physical presence of GSW's agent in Illi-
nois, the court could well have focused on GSW's overall activities
outside Illinois that intruded into and had an effect in Illinois.
Although both Illinois and Texas had some interest in providing a
forum for this kind of litigation, neither's interest is so overwhelming to
defeat the other's interest. Both Illinois and Texas satisfy the interest of
the parties to the transactions in a fair and convenient forum with an
impartial tribunal that each may reasonably expect to be chosen to liti-
gate disputes stemming from the transactions. In Biltmoor, the Seventh
Circuit correctly identified and balanced the interests of the states and
parties in light of the realities of today's commercial world. Still unad-
dressed, however, is whether as a matter of sound federal policy diver-
sity cases such as this one should be imposed statutorily on federal
courts with the ever increasing dockets of federal question cases, many
of which involve multi-district, complex, or protracted litigation.
33. 606 F.2d at 207.
34. Id
35. Id at 208.
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SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Subject matter jurisdiction is a limitation imposed by a sovereign
on the courts as its agents.3 6 It simply limits the power of the court to
hear certain kinds of cases. Within the federal judicial system the deci-
sions dealing with subject matter jurisdiction are not entirely consistent
or logical.3 7 Pragmatic needs of making a forum available often affect
the outcome of the decision. Factors that affect the outcome may in-
clude:
the extent of the caseload increase for federal trial courts if jurisdic-
tion is recognized; the extent to which cases of this class will, in prac-
tice, turn on issues of state or federal law; the extent of the necessity
for an expert federal tribunal to handle issues of state law that do




The Seventh Circuit found subject matter jurisdiction in a some-
what unusual way, under the federal common law of nuisance, in City
of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc. 39 The plaintiffs were
three municipal corporations that used water from the Ohio River, and
the defendants included Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc. and two met-
ropolitan sewage districts. The suit for damages alleged that Kentucky
Recycling discharged toxic chemicals into the systems of the defendant
metropolitan sewage districts, that the districts in turn discharged the
chemicals into the Ohio River, that the plaintiffs drew their water from
the Ohio River, and that the plaintiffs therefore sustained substantial
expenses in treating such contaminated water.40 The plaintiffs had as-
serted basically three grounds for jurisdiction:
(1) jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 133141 over implied rights of ac-
tion under-
36. Cooper v. Reynolds, 77 U.S. 308, 316 (1870).
37. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute (Part 11), 36 U. CHi. L. REV.
268, 276-79 (1969).
38. Cohen, The Broken Compass.- The Requirement That 4 Case Arise "Directly" Under Fed-
eralLaw, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 890, 916 (1967).
39. 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979).
40. Id. at 1010.
41. Section 1331 at that time provided:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States except that
no such sum or value shall be required in any such action brought against the United
States, any agency thereof, or any officer or employee thereof in his official capacity.
The $10,000 requirement, however, was eliminated on Dec. I, 1980 by the Federal Question Juris-
dictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, 94 Stat. 2369 (1980).
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(a) the Rivers and Harbors Act; 4 2
(b) the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972;43 and
(c) the Safe Drinking Water Act;44
(2) jurisdiction under the citizen suit provisions of the latter two
statutes; and
(3) jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over a right of action under
the federal common law of nuisance.
The plaintiffs also sought to represent a class of similarly situated mu-
nicipalities and waste treatment facilities. The federal district court
dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Although
the Seventh Circuit found no jurisdiction on the first two grounds as-
serted by the plaintiffs, it did find jurisdiction under federal common
law.45 First, relying upon the recent line of cases decided by the United
States Supreme Court which reasoned that "where Congress does not
expressly create a private cause of action, an intent to do so is not
lightly to be inferred, '46 the Seventh Circuit concluded that a private
right of action should not be inferred from Section 13 of the Rivers and
Harbors Act, which does not expressly create such a right.
4 7
Second, the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs had not com-
plied with the notice provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments. 48 The court concluded that, even if the notice re-
quirements had been satisfied, the Act did not authorize class actions or
42. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1976).
43. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & 1979 Supp.).
44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-9 (1976 & 1978 Supp.).
45. 604 F.2d at 1010-11, 1016-17, 1019.
46. Id. at 1011. See Shiffrin v. Bratton, 443 U.S. 903 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Reding-
ton, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
47. 604 F.2d 1011-12. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
It shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, or deposit, or cause, suffer, or procure to be
thrown, discharged or deposited ...from the shore, wharf, manufacturing establish-
ment, or mill of any kind, any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other
than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state, into
any navigable water of the United States, or into any tributary of any navigable water
from which the same shall float or be washed into such navigable water; ....
See also the court's discussion of the four factors to be considered in determining whether to
imply a private right of action as established in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 604 F.2d at 1011-
12.
48. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
(b) Notice
No action may be commenced-
(I) under subsection (a)(1) of this section-
(A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of the alleged
violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the state in which the alleged
violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the standard, limita-
tion, or order or
(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently pros-
ecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the United States, or a
State to require compliance with the standard, limitation, or order, but in
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actions for damages. 49 Furthermore, because the Act contains a "sav-
ings clause,"50 the court went on to consider the four factors established
in Cort v. Ash ,'I for determining whether to imply a private right of
action and held that they were not satisfied by the plaintiffs here.
52
Third, because the Safe Drinking Water Act contains a notice pro-
vision similar to that of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments,5 3 the court applied the same analysis as is set forth
above. 54 Also, the court noted that the conduct of the defendants was
not alleged to have violated the Safe Drinking Water Act, which sets
forth standards for drinking water and does not attempt to regulate
discharge of pollutants.
55
Finally, the court analyzed the federal common law grounds for
jurisdiction. Federal district courts have jurisdiction over civil actions
where the matter in controversy "arises under the . . . laws . . of the
United States."'56 The United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee57 had already decided that "laws" includes federal common
law as well as statutory law. In the present case, however, both the
defendants and the district court took the position that only a state
could file a suit under the federal common law of nuisance. 58 Although
the only plaintiff in City of Milwaukee was a state, the Seventh Circuit
any such action in a court of the United States any citizen may intervene
as a matter of right,
(2) under subsection (a)(2) of this section prior to sixty days after the plaintiff
has given notice of such action to the Administrator, except that such action may be
brought immediately after such notification in the case of an action under this sec-
tion respecting a violation of sections 1316 and 1317(a) of this title. Notice under
this subsection shall be given in such manner as the Administrator shall prescribe
by regulation.
49. 604 F.2d at 1014.
50. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1976) provides, "[nlothing in this section shall restrict any right
which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek en-
forcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief .... "
51. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The four factors in Cort are (1) whether the plaintiffwas a member of
the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, (2) whether there existed any legisla-
tive intent, implicit or explicit to either create or deny a private remedy, (3) whether implication
was consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme, and (4) whether the implied
cause of action was one traditionally relegated to state law. 422 U.S. at 78.
Cori may have been substantially changed by Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); and Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). Those cases indicate a less hospitable attitude by the
Court than that displayed in Cori. See Carter & Cumberworth, Implied Causes ofAction: A The-
ory Whose Time Has Come and Gone, 14 J. MAR. L. REV. 141 (1980).
52. 604 F.2d at 1014-16.
53. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1976) with 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1976).
54. 604 F.2d at 1016.
55. Id.
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1979 Supp.). For the text of § 1331(a) see note 41 supra.
57. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
58. 604 F.2d at 1017.
CHICAGO KENT L.W REVIEW
relied heavily upon that case as a guide on the issue of the propriety of
a private action under the federal common law of nuisance in an inter-
state water pollution case. In City of Milwaukee, the Supreme Court
had commented in a footnote that it is not only the character of the
parties that is to be taken into consideration and that where the contro-
versy touches fundamental federal interests, such as a case of pollution
of a body of water surrounded by a number of states, federal common
law should be established. 9 Lake Michigan was the cause of concern
leading to the Supreme Court's application of a federal common law of
interstate water pollution in City of Milwaukee. Similarly, the Seventh
Circuit found concern for the alleged pollution of the Ohio River in
City of Evansville. The court stated:
The plaintiffs are municipal or public corporations, subdivisions of
the state that were required to spend public funds because of pollu-
tion of an interstate waterway by acts done in another state. The
interests of the state in this interstate pollution dispute are implicated
in the same way such interests were implicated in Illinois v. Milwau-
kee.60
Although there is very little authority on this issue, the Seventh
Circuit's resolution of the question seems appropriate in view of that
limited authority. The business of the federal courts should be to re-
solve the kind of dispute raised by City of Evansville. Pollution of in-
terstate water is a matter of concern that transcends parochial state
interests. It is a matter of federal concern. Despite an increase in the
court dockets by finding federal question jurisdiction in cases such as
City of Evansville, federal courts provide a sympathetic, expert tribunal
in which legal disputes among non-federal entities may be resolved in a
manner consistent with a growing need to control interstate pollution.
Magistrate Jurisdiction
The Seventh Circuit decided a pair of cases involving the authority
of a United States Magistrate to preside over a civil trial.6' The court
concluded that United States Magistrates are authorized to conduct
civil trials in circumstances where the parties consent to the procedure,
where the matter is referred to the magistrate by a United States Dis-
59. 406 U.S. at 105 n.6.
60. 604 F.2d at 1018. The only direct authority available was the decision of one federal
district court in Township of Long Beach v. City of New York, 445 F. Supp. 1203 (D.N.J. 1978),
which held that a municipality can maintain a suit under the federal common law of interstate
water pollution.
61. Hill v. Jenkins, 603 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1979); Muhich v. Allen, 603 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir.
1979).
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trict Court, where the findings and the recommendations of the magis-
trate (as well as the objections, if any, of the parties) are filed with the
district court, where the district court conducts a de novo review of the
proceedings before the magistrate, and where the district court enters a
final judgment supported by the evidence and the applicable law.
62
The first case is Auhich v. Allen .63 In Auhich, the parties agreed to
the reference of their case to a United States Magistrate and such refer-
ence was ordered by the district court "for purposes of conducting all
proceedings, including trial and the entry of final judgment." 64 The
magistrate conducted all proceedings and presided over a jury trial of
the case. At the conclusion, the magistrate, upon motion by certain of
the defendants, directed verdicts as to them. The jury returned verdicts
in favor of the remaining defendants. 65 The plaintiff moved for a new
trial, but that motion was denied.66 The magistrate filed a number of
documents with the district court including a report and recommenda-
tion, the transcript of the proceedings, and the motions of the parties
along with the disposition of each. No objections to the magistrate's
report and recommendation were filed by the parties.
Thereafter, the district court reviewed the documents. The court
entered an order affirming and adopting the magistrate's rulings and
orders and directing the clerk of the court to enter final judgment for
the defendants. 67 As the district court concluded, "[t]he court is con-
vinced after having reviewed the entire record that the Orders of the
Magistrate and the jury verdict are supported by the evidence
presented and the law applicable thereto.
'68
The plaintiff appealed to the Seventh Circuit, asserting that, be-
cause a magistrate has no jurisdiction to conduct a civil trial, the dis-
trict court cannot enter a final judgment and thereby cure the
jurisdictional defect. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment,
69
notwithstanding the vigorous dissent of Judge Swygert.
70
The majority first noted that the authority of a United States Mag-
istrate to conduct a civil trial would have to be founded upon article III
62. Muhich v. Allen, 603 F.2d 1247, 1252 (7th Cir. 1979).
63. 603 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1979).
64. Id at 1249.
65. Id
66. Id
67. Id at 1250.
68. Id
69. Id at 1253.
70. Id at 1253-56. See text accompanying note 81 infra.
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of the United States Constitution,7' the Magistrates Act, 7 2 and local
court rules. 73 The majority emphasized that jurisdiction over a civil
case remains vested in the district court and is not lost to the magis-
trate, provided that the district court conducts de novo review and en-
ters the final judgment. 74 Therefore, the district court, an article III
court, properly exercised jurisdiction over the case. 75 Furthermore, the
majority pointed out that the Magistrates Act permits magistrates to
undertake additional duties consistent with the Constitution and laws
of the United States, 76 that the Act also requires district courts to adopt
local rules governing those duties, 77 and that the district court in this
case had by local rule conferred upon magistrates the authority to pre-
side over civil trials with the consent of the parties. 78 Therefore, the
majority concluded that the procedure employed in this case complied
with the Magistrates Act and local court rules.
79
Judge Swygert filed a vigorous and persuasive dissent.80 He ex-
pressed his basic premise by reasoning, "I do not believe that Congress
in the Magistrates Act intended to empower magistrates to assume an
adjudicatory function otherwise performed in our Nation only by an
Article III judge, and that therefore jurisdiction is lacking."' Judge
Swygert appropriately emphasized that, although the plaintiff con-
sented to the referral of the case to the magistrate, such consent could
not vest the magistrate and thus, the district court, with jurisdiction.
82
71. Article Ill, § I provides:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good
Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
72. Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (1976) provides, "[a] magistrate may be assigned
such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States."
73. Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(4) (1976) provides, "[elach district court shall estab-
lish rules pursuant to which the magistrates shall discharge their duties."
Rule 38(b)(5)(c) of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois pro-
vides in part, "[iun addition to the other powers expressly provided by Rule 38(b), the Magistrate
shall have the authority to . . . [wlith the written consent of the parties, hear and determine all
motions, conduct the trial, enter findings of fact and conclusions of law and final judgments in
civil cases."
74. 603 F.2d at 1251. See Taylor v. Oxford, 575 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1978), holding that a
United States Magistrate is not empowered to enter a final judgment. Id. at 154.
75. 603 F.2d at 1251.
76. See note 72 supra.
77. See note 73 supra.
78. Id
79. 603 F.2d at 1251.
80. Id at 1253-56.
81. Id at 1253 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
82. Id Judge Swygert explained, "[iut is true that plaintiffs complaints on appeal challeng-
ing the adjudicatory procedure here employed do not lie well with her, inasmuch as she originally
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Without reaching the constitutional issue,83 Judge Swygert, after a
substantial review of congressional history and commentary regarding
the Magistrates Act,84 concluded that it was not the intent of Congress
to delegate the important judicial function of presiding over a civil trial
to a magistrate. Judge Swygert maintained instead that Congress in-
tended that magistrates would perform administrative functions in or-
der to free district judges to conduct trials.85 The judge added that, if
Congress had wanted magistrates to conduct civil trials, the Act could
have expressly so provided, rather than allowing such significant au-
thority to be inferred from the "additional duties" language of the
Act.86 Finally, Judge Swygert made an interesting and persuasive
point about the requirement for de novo review by the district court of
the proceedings before the magistrate. He said, "[b]ut this allegedly de
novo review actually amounted to little more than an appellate-type
check for gross errors."87 Later, Judge Swygert commented:
The jury is factfinder in a federal trial of this sort, and its verdict
once reached is not lightly set aside. But that verdict is shaped by
what takes place before it, and those events are in significant part
controlled by the rulings of the magistrate. Thus, unless the district
court judge wishes to upset the jury verdict, he cannot substitute his
judgment at a later date for that rendered by the magistrate during
trial. He will, of course, be reluctant to do so, and instead will at
most check to see if any of the magistrate's trial rulings are arguably
supportable. Having assigned the entire trial to the magistrate, he will
be reluctant to take it back to do all over again.
8
8
consented to the reference to the magistrate. But it is equally true, indeed it is axiomatic, that
parties cannot themselves confer subject matter jurisdiction." Id
83. Id at 1256. Judge Swygert stated:
Thus, I would not reach the Article III concerns implicated by this practice, and accord-
ingly I will not further lengthen this dissent with my views on them. I would state,
however, that I have serious doubts as to the constitutionality of allowing a non-Article
Ill official to perform a traditional, judicial function so central to the exercise of the
judicial power of the United States as that of presiding over a federal civil jury trial.
Id
84. Id at 1253-55. See also T.P.O., Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1972), where
Judge Sprecher sets forth "[plerhaps the most thorough analysis of the legislative history of the
Magistrates Act prior to its amendments in 1976." 603 F.2d at 1253.
85. See 603 F.2d at 1253-55. See especially 603 F.2d at 1254, quotingfrom the House Report
as follows:
Rather than constituting "an abdication of the judicial function", it seems to the
committee that the use of a magistrate under the provisions of S. 1283, as amended, will
further the congressional intent that the magistrate assist the district judge in a variety of
pretrial and preliminary matters thereby facilitating the ultimate and final exercise of the
adjudicatory function at the trial of the case.
H.R. REP. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
6162, 6167.
86. See note 72 supra.
87. 603 F.2d at 1255.
88. Id (emphasis added).
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The second case involving magistrate jurisdiction is Hill v. Jen-
kins.89 Hill, a state prison inmate, filed a pro se complaint in federal
district court against certain prison officials alleging violations of his
constitutional rights as the result of a shakedown at the prison during
which some of his personal property was confiscated and not returned.
He sought a jury trial, injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as dam-
ages.90 The district court scheduled a non-jury evidentiary hearing at
the prison presided over by a United States Magistrate. 9' Hill testified,
put on other evidence, examined witnesses, and cross-examined oppos-
ing witnesses. The magistrate requested that both sides submit pro-
posed findings of fact and conclusions of law.92 Hill, however, sent a
letter to the district court asking for information and assistance with
respect to the material he was supposed to file. The record was silent as
to any response from the district court. Hill filed no findings or conclu-
sions, although the appellees did file findings and conclusions directly
with the district court. Furthermore, no transcript of the proceedings
was filed with the district court, nor did the magistrate file any findings
or recommendations with the district court. As a result, the court
adopted verbatim the findings and conclusions filed by the appellees.
Hill appealed, challenging the adjudicatory procedure of referring his
case to the magistrate for hearing.
93
As a preliminary matter, the Seventh Circuit noted that the hear-
ing before the magistrate amounted to a trial.94 Relying upon the stan-
dards set forth in Muhich,95 the circuit court commented that "the
reference procedure in this case utterly failed to satisfy these stan-
dards."'96 Specifically, the court pointed out (1) that the matter was
referred to the magistrate without the consent of the parties, (2) that
there were no local court rules permitting a magistrate to preside over a
civil trial, and (3) that the district court did not conduct de novo review
of the proceedings. 97 As to the last point regarding de novo review, the
circuit court thought it obvious that there was an absence of de novo
review where no transcript was filed with the district court, where Hill
had not filed proposed findings of fact or conclusions of law, where the
89. 603 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1979).
90. Id at 1257.
91. Id
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1257-58.
94. Id at 1258.
95. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
96. 603 F.2d at 1258.
97. Id
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appellees filed their findings and conclusions with the district court
rather than with the magistrate, where the magistrate filed no findings
or recommendations, and where the district court adopted verbatim the
findings and conclusions of the appellees.98 The circuit court reversed
and remanded the judgment for further proceedings. 99
Judge Swygert concurred in the result. io0 He first pointed out that
although "prisoner petitions challenging conditions of confinement"
may be referred to magistrates for evidentiary hearings, this case did
not involve such a situation.' 0 ' Secondly, Judge Swygert, in keeping
with his dissent in Muhich, °102 concluded that "Congress has not [other-
wise] authorized a magistrate to accept subject matter jurisdiction over
a case such as this."'
0 3
The results in Muhich and Hill are not unexpected. Despite Judge
Swygert's concern that the decisions granted jurisdiction to magistrates
beyond that contemplated by statute, federal courts which are hard-
pressed to keep their dockets current are likely to devise means to re-
duce the pressures of case overloads. Given the procedural protections
of a de novo review by the district court judge, complaints regarding
the magistrate's power to hear civil cases most likely reflect a disgrun-
tled litigant's hopes of again litigating a matter that may otherwise have
been conclusively resolved between the parties and removed from the
federal court's docket.
Collateral Attack
In Waste Management of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Fokakis,104 the Seventh
Circuit was confronted for the first time with the jurisdictional question
of whether a corporation could collaterally attack a state court criminal
conviction under the federal Civil Rights Act.10 5 The corporation,
Waste Management, was convicted and fined in a Wisconsin state court
for violating that state's "Little Sherman Act."" 6 The conviction was
affirmed on appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court where the corpora-
tion argued that it had been denied its constitutional rights. 0 7 Certio-
98. Id at 1258-59.
99. Id at 1259.
100. Id at 1259-60.
101. Id at 1260. See Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (1976).
102. See notes 80-88 supra and accompanying text.
103. 603 F.2d at 1260.
104. 614 F.2d 138 (7th Cir. 1980).
105. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & 1979 Supp.).
106. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 133.01 (West 1974) (current version at Wis. STAT. ANN. § 133.03
(West Supp. 1980)).
107. State v. Waste Management, 81 Wis. 2d 555, 261 N.W.2d 147 (1978).
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rari was denied by the United States Supreme Court. 0 8 The
corporation subsequently brought suit in federal district court seeking
to have the state court conviction invalidated due to violation of the
corporation's civil rights, but the district court dismissed the case for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 109
The Seventh Circuit also concluded that jurisdiction was lacking
and relied heavily upon its earlier decision Hanson v. Circuit Court.I t0
There, the Seventh Circuit had said that habeas corpus is "the exclusive
federal remedy for all who seek to attack state court judgments of con-
victions," I " ' but the facts of that case limited the holding to the attempt
by an "individual" to collaterally attack a state court conviction under
the federal Civil Rights Act. 1 2 Hanson had received only a fine, rather
than a sentence of imprisonment, and therefore could not satisfy the
custody requirement to qualify for habeas corpus relief."
13
Because of the fictional entity status of a corporation, it cannot be
put into custody and cannot qualify for habeas corpus relief. ' 4 There-
fore, the Seventh Circuit sought to determine whether it should treat
the corporation in Waste Management as it had treated the individual
in Hanson and restrict its opportunity for collateral attack to habeas
corpus. With heavy emphasis upon the expressed and inferred inten-
tions of Congress in limiting federal intrusions into state court judg-
ments, the Seventh Circuit barred the attempt by the corporation to
collaterally attack the state conviction under the Civil Rights Act." 5
The Seventh Circuit concluded its opinion with an important pol-
icy statement supporting its result:
The Corporation's position is untenable also because it seeks not par-
ity with similarly situated individuals but preferential treatment.
That a corporation cannot be imprisoned or otherwise placed in cus-
tody is an incident of the status conferred on it as an entity wholly
distinct from its shareholders. As such, it is one of many benefits
conferred on the corporate form--e.g., limited liability of sharehold-
ers for corporate debts-for the purpose of facilitating capital forma-
tion. The corporate form similarly insulates shareholders from
108. Waste Management v. Wisconsin, 439 U.S. 865 (1978).
109. 614 F.2d at 139.
110. 591 F.2d 404 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 907 (1979).
111. Id at 410 (emphasis added).
112. See 614 F.2d at 139-40.
113. It should be noted that other circuit courts might reach different results in cases like
Hanson. See, e.g., Strader v. Troy, 571 F.2d 1263 (4th Cir. 1978); Shipp v. Todd, 568 F.2d 133
(9th Cir. 1978).
114. 614 F.2d at 140. See generally W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 4942 (perm. ed. 1978).
115. 614 F.2d at 141-42.
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liability for the crimes of the corporations in which they hold stock.
If our corporate system were so drastically different that we subjected
shareholders to imprisonment, habeas corpus relief certainly would
be available in appropriate circumstances. But to couple such a ben-
eficial incident of the corporate form with elimination of a custody
requirement for collateral attack of state court convictions would
place corporations in a far more desirable position than individuals
fined under state court judgments of conviction. Absent any showing
of congressional authorization for such a result, and in light of possi-
ble problems posed by the equal protection guarantee of the fifth
amendment, we hold that the relief the Corporation seeks is beyond
the protection Congress intended and beyond the scope of benefits
inhering in the corporate form. We therefore decline to limit Hanson
and here reaffirm that habeas corpus is the exclusive federal route to
collateral attack of state court convictions.' 16
The Seventh Circuit's insistence on the need for custody as a basis
for habeas corpus is sound. The use of habeas corpus would be ex-
panded to a great variety of situations by excepting individuals, and
even more so corporations, from the custody requirement. Habeas
corpus as a procedural device is traditionally used to protect an indi-
vidual's right to liberty. To encourage federal review of state criminal
proceedings involving fines only invites a substantial increase in the
federal dockets with concomitant artificial distinctions being fashioned
such as quasi-criminal versus criminal proceedings and the amount of
the fine necessary to confer jurisdiction. It would also increase the in-
trusion of the federal government, albeit in the name of procedural
fairness, into an area principally of state concern.
Appellate Jurisdiction
Final orders are immediately appealable; generally, interlocutory
orders are not immediately appealable. 1 7 A "final order" is one that
disposes of all issues between all parties remaining in the litigation.
118
Additionally, a "final order" is one that determines an important, dis-
puted issue collateral to the merits of the litigation that as a practical
matter is otherwise not reviewable. 19 Such an order is described as a
"collateral final order." An "interlocutory order" is one that disposes
of fewer than all issues between all parties remaining in the litiga-
tion. 120 It also may be a ruling on a procedural matter that does not
116. Id
117. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
118. Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 370 (1920).
119. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
120. Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427 (1956).
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dispose of an issue or a party.' 2' The reason for limiting appeals to
final orders is to avoid piecemeal appeals which are thought to be dis-
ruptive of the litigation. Appellate review of interlocutory orders in
certain circumstances, however, may expedite the litigation. 122 For that
reason interlocutory orders are immediately appealable in some situa-
tions.
Two federal provisions allow immediate appeals from interlocu-
tory orders. The first provision is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
54(b). 123 It provides for appeals from an order that disposes of fewer
than all the issues or all the parties in multiple issue or party litigation
if the trial court finds there is "no just reason for delay" of immediate
enforcement of the order. 124 The second provision is 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b).' 25 Section 1292(b) provides for appeals from an order not
otherwise appealable when the order "involves a controlling question
of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion
and that immediate appeal . . . may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation." 1
26
In addition to these two provisions that allow immediate appellate
review of interlocutory orders, a petition for a writ of mandamus as an
original action filed in the court of appeals may allow immediate re-
121. Baltimore Contractors v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176 (1955).
122. See note 125 infra.
123. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) provides:
Judgment upon Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple Parties. When more than
one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-
claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct
the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties
only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and
direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates
fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not
terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of
decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all
the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
124. Id
125. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976) provides:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable
under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question
of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an
immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals may there-
upon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is
made to it within ten days after the entry of the order: Provided, however, That applica-
tion for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the




view of interlocutory orders. 27 The writ will issue to limit a trial court
to its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its jurisdiction
when it is its duty to do so.' 28 Further, the writ will issue only when the
action complained of is as a practical matter otherwise not review-
able. 1
29
As complex or extended litigation becomes more commonplace in
modern litigation, the situations in which immediate review of interloc-
utory orders may expedite the litigation may increase. In 1979, the
Seventh Circuit in In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Liti-
gation (GM 1)130 reviewed and reversed the trial court's order that ap-
proved distribution of notice of a settlement offer to a subclass of
Oldsmobile buyers whose cars had other than Oldsmobile transmis-
sions. 13' The court remanded the order for further hearings by the trial
court. The Seventh Circuit determined that the order was immediately
appealable as a "final collateral order."'' 32 Compared to other deci-
sions, the court's interpretation of the final collateral order doctrine was
broad and generous. 133 It may have encouraged those who favor im-
mediate review of interlocutory orders in complex litigation. In 1980,
the Seventh Circuit in Oswald v. McGarr (GM II) 13 4 dismissed an ap-
peal of the trial court's order on remand from GM I that authorized
notice of a settlement offer. The court in GM II determined that the
order was not a final collateral order. 35 It, therefore, declined to re-
view the order. Alternatively, it entertained but denied a petition for a
writ of mandamus to review the order. 136 The court, however, warned:
[W]e must again caution that this is not the usual procedure that will
be permitted in class actions. Under most circumstances, a notice
mailed to class members in the course of a class action is not review-
able under any standard. Our review was proper and necessitated
solely because of our obligation to ensure compliance with our previ-
ous mandate. 13
7
The court went on to rule that "Judge McGarr complied fully and ca-
127. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655 (1978); Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90
(1967).
128. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21 (1943).
129. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90 (1967). But see La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S.
249 (1957) in which the dissent charged the Court with departing from the requirement that the
order was not otherwise reviewable.
130. 594 F.2d 1106 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979).
131. Id at 1117.
132. Id at 1117-21.
133. See GALLAGHER, supra note 32, at 134.
134. 620 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1980).
135. Id at 1193-94.
136. Id at 1195-96.
137. Id at 1200.
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pably with that mandate."' 38 It held that the trial court, therefore, had
properly exercised its jurisdiction. 3 9
The court in GM I first addressed the appealability of the order
that authorized distribution of the proposed notice of settlement. It
pointed out that the order would bind the entire subclass. 140 Further,
the order would have ended the entire litigation as to that subclass.
The court argued that the procedural history of the litigation indicated
that the order conclusively determined a disputed issue. The trial court
had twice refused to reconsider its initial order which it had entered
only after extensive hearings. Although the court conceded that the
issue was not clearly collateral to the merits of the case, the court next
argued that the concept of collateral necessary for appealability was not
required in a sense a "semanticist might expect."' 4' It concluded that
the order was sufficiently collateral for the purposes of the final collat-
eral order doctrine. The court finally argued that the order was not
reviewable as a practical matter if not appealed immediately. On that
basis the court in GM I held the order was a final collateral order.
In GMI, the court concluded that the standards for reviewing set-
tlement offers under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) were inap-
plicable since the proposed offer, unlike those contemplated by that
rule, would not bind the entire class.142 It, therefore, promulgated stan-
dards 43 to assure complete and accurate disclosure to the members of
the subclass of their available options. The Seventh Circuit did not
require reconsideration of whether the amount offered was fair, reason-
able and adequate. The court only cautioned that the amount offered
should not be nominal. It left to the trial court's discretion, under the
newly promulgated standards, the determination of the form and con-
tent of the notice of a settlement offer.
On remand the trial court held further hearings. 44 It found the
amount offered was not merely nominal, approved a proposed notice's
form and content as accurate and complete, and once again authorized
138. Id.
139. Id
140. 594 F.2d at 1123. See GALLAGHER, supra note 32, at 134-35.
141. Id. at 1119.
142. Id. at 1138-39.
143. The court explained that an offer to settle "should contain sufficient information to en-
able a class member to determine (I) whether to accept the offer to settle, (2) the effects of settling,
and (3) the available avenues for pursuing his claim if he does not settle." Id at 1139.
144. Judge McGarr held two days of hearings on the adequacy of the proposed notice, but did




Some representative members of the subclass objected to the man-
ner in which the proceedings were conducted in the trial court and to
the finding of the court. 46 Once again they appealed. They claimed
the order that authorized the distribution of the notice to the subclass
was a final collateral order. 147 In addition, they filed a petition for a
writ of mandamus. In both the appeal and the petition they claimed
that the trial court unduly restricted the form and- content of the notice
in violation of their first amendment right to communicate to other
members, and that the trial court failed to hold sufficient hearings so
that the amount offered was indeed nominal.
48
The Seventh Circuit in GM II first addressed its jurisdiction to
review the trial court's procedures and findings. It delineated three cri-
teria for an order to be a final collateral order. The court stated that
first, the order must conclusively determine a disputed issue; second,
the order must resolve an issue completely collateral to the merits of
the litigation; and third, the order must be, as a practical matter, not
reviewable if it is not immediately appealed.' 49 The court then held
that the order that authorized distribution of the notice of the proposed
settlement to the subclass was not a final collateral order. 150 It summa-
rily disposed of the claim that the trial court interfered with the sub-
class members' first amendment rights. It ruled that the order did not
resolve an issue other than the form of the notice that was reviewable
after final judgment. '5 ' Citing precedent, the court described this posi-
tion as "settled law."' 52 It disposed of the second claim that the
amount offered was nominal. Applying the first criterion to the order,
the court pointed out that the notice of the settlement offer did not
dispose of anyone's rights. 153 Therefore, according to the court, the or-
der did not conclusively determine a disputed issue. Applying the sec-
ond criterion, the court next pointed out that whether the settlement





149. Id at 1193-94.
150. Id at 1193-95.
151. Id at 1193.
152. Id at 1194.
153. Id at 1193-94.
154. Id at 1194. The court explained, "[tihe second criteria, [sic] that the order resolve an
issue completely separate from the merits of the action, is also not met. The determination of the
value of the claims is the very heart of the litigation, and will be at issue again if another binding
settlement is proposed or if a determination of damages is required after trial." Id.
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class members reject the offer, the amount of damages must be liti-
gated. The court concluded, therefore, that the order did not resolve an
issue collateral to the merits of the litigation. Applying the third crite-
rion, the court pointed out that the order complained of in the appeal at
hand is reviewable along with other orders after final judgment .
55
Therefore, the order was reviewable on appeal after all issues between
all parties were determined.
The court in GM HI finally addressed the petition for a writ of
mandamus. 5 6 It again summarily disposed of the claim that the trial
court interfered with the subclass members' first amendment rights to
communicate with other members. It recognized that some courts al-
low a mandamus to correct "grievous constitutional violations" if the
violation is as a practical matter otherwise not reviewable. 157 The court
held that restrictions on the form of the notice did not violate constitu-
tional provisions and were reviewable along with other rulings after
final judgment.1
58
The court then disposed of the claim that the amount offered was
nominal. It reviewed its instructions to the trial court in GM I and the
trial court's action on remand. It concluded that the trial court did
comply with the mandate. 59 The court therefore denied the petition
for a writ of mandamus.
In GM II the court seemingly rejected the broad and generous
interpretation of the final collateral order doctrine in GM I. It warned
that interlocutory review of class action orders by appeals or manda-
mus is not a favored procedure. The court's opinion in GM II may
discourage those who favor immediate review of interlocutory orders in
complex litigation. It may also give a great deal more power to district
court judges in managing complex litigation and calendars. Obviously,
the relative ease by which a litigant may obtain interlocutory review
affects the litigant's strategy and tactics in the trial court. It also affects
the distribution of caseloads between the appellate and trial courts.
155. Id at 1194-95.
156. Id. at 1195-96.
157. Id at 1195. The Seventh Circuit reasoned, "[wihile some courts have used mandamus as
a vehicle for correcting grievous constitutional violations, the circumstances here do not warrant
such an approach. First, the mere assertion of constitutional violation is not sufficient to warrant a
writ of mandamus. The error must be one that cannot be adequately corrected by normal appeals
process." Id (citation omitted).
158. Id at 1193-95.
159. Id at 1199-1200.
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COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIMS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) generally defines a "com-
pulsory counterclaim" as a claim against an opposing party that arises
out of the same transaction or occurrence as the opposing party's
claim. 60 The purpose of rule 13(a) is to prevent a multiplicity of ac-
tions in the interest of judicial economy. 16 Compulsory counterclaims
are significant for two principal reasons. First, failure to bring a com-
pulsory counterclaim bars the claim thereafter,162 and second, for pur-
poses of jurisdiction, a compulsory counterclaim is ancillary, that is, it
may have but need not have its own independent jurisdictional basis. 163
The test most commonly used to decide whether a counterclaim is com-
pulsory is the logical relationship between the claim and counterclaim.
If the counterclaim is logically related to the claim, the counterclaim
then arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the claim. 164
Application of the logical relationship test, however, often proves diffi-
cult and spawns substantial disagreement at times.
165
In Valencia v. Anderson Bros. Ford,166 the Seventh Circuit held
that a lender's claim against A borrower for money owed was not a
compulsory counterclaim to the borrower's claim against the lender for
improper disclosures on a contract and note under the Truth in Lend-
ing Act. 167 Since the counterclaim did not have an independent juris-
dictional basis, the court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the
counterclaim.
In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit noted a conflict among the cir-
cuits and district courts on the counterclaim issue. 168 It recognized that
the literal language of rule 13(a) suggests the counterclaim was compul-
sory. The court applied the logical relationship test, however, and con-
cluded that the initial execution of the loan agreement was the only
160. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) provides in part:
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the
pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require
for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire juris-
diction.
161. Warshawsky & Co. v. Arcata Nat'l Corp., 552 F.2d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir. 1977).
162. Kennedy v. Jones, 44 F.R.D. 52, 55 (E.D. Va. 1968).
163. Hercules, Inc. v. Dynamic Export Corp., 71 F.R.D. 101, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
164. Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631, 634 (3d Cir. 1961).
165. See, e.g., LASA Per L'Industria del Marmo Societa Per Azioni v. Southern Builders, Inc.,
45 F.R.D. 435 (W.D. Tenn. 1967), rev'd, 414 F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1969).
166. 617 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1980).
167. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1976). [Hereinafter referred to as TILA].
168. 617 F.2d at 1290-91.
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link between the two claims. According to the Seventh Circuit, that
link was too insignificant to satisfy the logical relationship test.
The court relied heavily on the competing purposes of rule 13(a)
and the TILA. The purpose of rule 13(a) is to avoid multiplicity of
actions in the interest of judicial economy, 169 whereas the purpose of
the TILA is to encourage full disclosure of the terms of consumer con-
tracts and loans. 170 The TILA provides a civil penalty as a deterrent
against failure to make full disclosure.' 7' A TILA claim often may be
resolved in a simple, expeditious hearing on the face of the agree-
ment.' 72 The court concluded that to label the purely private state
claim for money owed as a compulsory counterclaim that would likely
involve an extended evidentiary hearing, would frustrate the federal
policy of the TILA and fail to materially advance judicial economy. 1
73
The Seventh Circuit in Valencia recognized the need to choose be-
tween two clearly enunciated competing federal policies: one substan-
tive under TILA, the other procedural under rule 13. Even assuming
the purpose of rule 13 in expediting litigation could be satisfied in the
fact situations exemplified by Valencia, the substantive policy of the
TILA should still dictate that the counterclaim be declared permissive.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to see just how the purpose of rule 13 could
be satisfied under those facts, particularly if actions such as Valencia
were converted to class actions. In such a situation the potential for
procedural abuse through the use of compulsory counterclaims is enor-
mous.
DISCOVERY
Within the federal system, the civil rules of discovery are fairly
stable and generally accepted. 174 Concern about the rules today centers
principally on improper use of discovery to frustrate its goals of expe-
diting litigation and of disposing of litigation on the merits. 17 5 Three
cases decided by the Seventh Circuit last term present interesting ques-
tions regarding the application of the civil rules of discovery. 176 United
169. Warshawsky & Co. v. Arcata Nat'l Corp., 552 F.2d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir. 1977).
170. 617 F.2d at 1282.
171. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1640(a), 1681(n), 1681(o) (1976).
172. 617 F.2d at 1291.
173. Id at 1292.
174. See Johnston, Discovery in Illinois and Federal Courts, 2 J. MAR. J. OF PRAC. AND PRO.
22, 30 (1968).
175. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee to study the high cost of litigation to the Seventh Cir-
cuit Judicial Committee and the Bar Association of the Seventh Federal Circuit, 86 F.R.D. 267,
271 (1980).
176. Socialist Workers Party v. Grubisic, 619 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1980); In re Folding Carton
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States v. Balistrieri,77 a case of first impression, raised the issue of
whether the civil rules of discovery apply to motions in the nature of a
writ of coram nobis. 78 In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation 179 ad-
dressed the application of the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination as a limitation on the scope of civil discovery, and Social-
ist Workers Party v. Grubisic'80 dealt with federal-state relations where
a civil rights plaintiff sought disclosure of state grand jury transcripts.
In Balistrieri, the court ruled that in a motion in the nature of a
writ coram nobis, a trial court may apply both the civil and criminal
rules of procedure.' 8 ' Relying on an historical analysis, the court con-
cluded that coram nobis is a hybrid action---quasi-civil and quasi-crim-
inal.' 82 It noted that despite the 28 U.S.C. § 2255 provision of a
statutory scheme for post-conviction relief and the Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60 provision of a vehicle for relief from civil judg-
ments, both of which did away with the writ coram nobis, the "ancient
writ of error coram nobis [has risen] phoenix-like from the ashes of
American Jurisprudence .... ,,183 The court added that its purpose is
to allow the court of first resort to correct its own errors. Now that the
writ has arisen from the ashes, the question for the trial court was
whether the writ was a continuation of the criminal case in which the
conviction was obtained or a new action. If it was a continuation of the
criminal case, the criminal rules of procedure were applicable. If it was
a new action, the civil rules of procedure were applicable.
The facts in Balistrieri were not in dispute. Balistrieri was con-
victed for filing false income tax returns. 84 He learned later that a
Antitrust Litigation, 609 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Balistrieri, 606 F.2d 216 (7th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1850 (1980). A fourth decision, In re Special September 1978
Grand Jury (II), No. 79-1218 (7th Cir. April 30, 1980), modified, (Dec. 19, 1980), tangentially
addresses the scope of civil rules of discovery. In that case the Seventh Circuit held that a client's
ongoing fraud waives the work-product privilege when asserted by either the lawyer or the client
to protect information received in preparation for litigation, but that the attorney may rely upon
the work-product doctrine to protect his mental impressions, conclusions or legal theories. See 23
ATLA J. 255, 255 (1980).
177. 606 F.2d 216 (7th Cir. 1979), ceri. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1850 (1980).
178. Unlike appellate review, coram nobis was available at common law in both civil and
criminal proceedings to bring before the court that rendered judgment errors in matters of fact
which had not been put in issue or passed upon, and which were material to the validity and
regularity of the legal proceeding in which the judgment was rendered, in order to modify the
judgment. 7 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.14, at 46-54 (2d ed. 1979).
179. 609 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1979).
180. 619 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1980).
181. 606 F.2d at 218, 221. Addressing the merits, the court also found no reason to set aside
the movant's conviction. Id. at 222.
182. Id at 221.
183. Id at 219.
184. Id at 218.
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conversation he had had with his lawyer and others, some of whom
were under surveillance, had been recorded by government agents.
The government contended that the surveillance was unrelated to Ba-
listrieri's case. 185 Balistrieri then brought a motion in the nature of a
writ coram nobis to set aside the conviction. He sought to use the civil
rules of discovery to obtain information for the hearing on his motion.
After an in camera production of the monitoring logs of the surveil-
lance, the trial court found that the surveillance of the others, who were
the targets of the investigation, did not contribute to Balistrieri's con-
viction.' 8 6 The trial court, therefore, entered a protective order under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) 87 quashing Balistrieri's de-
mands and motions for discovery. In affirming the trial court, the Sev-
enth Circuit stated:
The protective order may limit the scope or manner of discovery or
limit the number of persons who see the discovered material. Coram
nobis motions, insofar as they are sometimes made long after the
judgment of conviction was rendered, are peculiarly appropriate can-
didates for the use of the district court's discretion under Rule 26(c).
The district court's discretion to quash Balistrieri's discovery requests
was within the discretion under the rule, especially in light of the
breadth of the discovery requests in relation to the rather narrow
ground of illegal surveillance upon which the coram nobis motion
was based.
Rule 16, F.R.Cr.P., is an unsatisfactory vehicle for discovery re-
quest in proceedings on a coram nobis motion. Facts which affect
the validity of the conviction or sentence are unlikely to be found
solely within the narrow scope of discovery allowed by Rule 16.188
The court further noted that it is "necessary to grant applicants [for a
writ coram nobis] the scope of discovery under civil rules and, at the
same time, assure the government and others of due protection from
burdens arising from participation in old criminal proceedings."'
' 89
In Folding Carton,'" another case raising a question with regard
to federal rules of discovery, the Seventh Circuit addressed the issue of
the application of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion as a limitation on the scope of discovery. The court noted that
although the trial court has discretion to assess the facts which underlie
185. Id.
186. Id at 222.
187. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) provides in part, "for good cause shown, the court in which the
action is pending ... [Imlay make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person
from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense ....
188. 606 F.2d at 221.
189. Id
190. 609 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1979).
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an asserted fifth amendment privilege, the court of appeals determines,
as a matter of law, the standard to be applied in all cases. 19' In Folding
Carton, the Seventh Circuit rejected the trial court's standard that the
privilege was inapplicable when prosecution was unlikely. 
92
In Folding Carton, an officer of Container Corporation was in-
dicted, pleaded nolo contendere, and was sentenced for conspiracy to
fix prices in a prior criminal action. 193 The officer, Brown, served his
sentence. In subsequent civil litigation Brown was deposed but refused
to answer certain questions. He asserted his fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. The trial court ordered Brown to answer. It
found that under the circumstances, further criminal prosecution of
Brown by either the federal or state authorities was unlikely. 19 The
court concluded that Brown had no "reasonable fear" of prosecution.
Nevertheless, Brown refused to answer the questions. The trial court,
therefore, held Brown in contempt of court. 95
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit noted with approval the Ninth Cir-
cuit's standard that the right to assert the privilege rests on the possibil-
ity rather than the likelihood of prosecution. 19 6 It pointed out that in
some situations the statute of limitations, grants of immunity, and the
bar of double jeopardy provide absolute protection against subsequent
prosecution. 197 The court added, however, that absent such protection,
"the trial court looks to the possibility of incrimination but not the
probability of the filing of an indictment in ascertaining the validity of
a fifth amendment privilege."'' 98
The standard adopted by the Seventh Circuit seems broader than
that adopted by the Ninth Circuit. It focuses on the possibility of in-
crimination regardless of the potential for prosecution. The Ninth Cir-
cuit's standard focuses on the possibility of prosecution. The difference
could be important in cases such as Folding Carton where the trial
court found that even if Brown's answers were incriminating, the privi-
lege was inapplicable as it was unlikely the government would reopen
its "massive completed investigation." Unlike the Seventh Circuit's
standard, the Ninth Circuit's standard may preclude the use of the
191. Id at 871 n.5.
192. Id at 871, 873.
193. Id at 869. The district court imposed a sentence of fifteen days, a $15,000 fine and a
mandatory probationary project.
194. Id at 870.
195. Id
196. Id at 872, referring to In re Master Key Litigation, 507 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1974).
197. 609 F.2d at 872.
198. Id
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privilege even though the testimony is incriminating but the possibility
of prosecution is remote.
In Socialist Workers,199 the Seventh Circuit deferred in the first
instance to the supervising state court on the issue of discoverability of
state grand jury transcripts. Nevertheless, it reserved final determina-
tion of the issue to the federal trial court.
2°°
The plaintiffs in Socialist Workers filed a civil rights action against
various defendants who allegedly harrassed the plaintiffs because of
their political views. Among the defendants were individual members
of the Chicago Police Department and the Legion of Justice, a right-
wing paramilitary organization. During the discovery process the de-
fendants took positions contrary to a report by Cook County Grand
Jury 655 on the defendants' activities and contrary to portions of testi-
mony in Grand Jury 655's transcripts from a state criminal prosecution
against the defendants. The plaintiffs sought disclosure of those tran-
scripts but the Cook County State's Attorney objected to their produc-
tion. The trial court ordered portions of the transcript disclosed and
the remainder of the transcript delivered to the trial court for in camera
examination.
20'
The Seventh Circuit unequivocally ruled that federal law ulti-
mately controls discovery in a federal action in federal court.20 2 It rec-
ognized that both state and federal law limit access to grand jury
transcripts. The court stated that state policy is based on the need "to
prevent escape of those under indictment, to ensure free deliberations,
to prevent subornation of perjury, to encourage disclosure by witnesses,
and to protect the innocent from unwarranted exposure. ' 20 3 It added
that federal policy is based on similar concerns. The court noted, how-
ever, that federal grand jury transcripts may be disclosed to private
parties in another judicial proceeding to avoid a possible injustice.
Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit felt the "strong policy of comity be-
tween state and federal sovereignties impels federal courts to recognize
state privileges where this can be accomplished at no substantial cost to
federal substantive and procedural policy. ' ' 2°4 Under the circum-
stances the court concluded that the federal trial court should defer in
the first instance to the supervising state court.205 It reasoned that this
199. 619 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1980).
200. Id at 644.
201. Id at 643.
202. Id at 643-44.
203. Id at 643.
204. Id at 644.
205. Id.
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procedure would allow the state court, familiar with state policy and
the need for continuing secrecy, to rule on the discoverability of the
transcripts and also would avoid needless disruption of state criminal
proceedings. The court ruled, however, that if the transcripts were not
discoverable, according to the state court, the federal court then would
consider whether the transcripts were discoverable under federal law
based on the state court proceedings.
20 6
Balistrieri, Folding Carton and Socialist Workers all demonstrate a
sensitive balance of competing interests. The unique nature of a writ
coram nobis when used to collaterally attack a criminal conviction does
not lend itself to an easy solution to the question of what information
should be available. The writ is of little value if the petitioner is limited
to the relatively restrictive rules of criminal procedure. Yet, unlimited
use of civil rules of procedure fails to fully protect the often over-
whelming need to protect the government's sources of confidential in-
formation needed to successfully investigate and prosecute
conspiracies, or the difficulty imposed on the government to defend
against stale claims. Folding Carton decides between the competing in-
terests of the individual against self-incrimination and the govern-
ment's need to prosecute cases in which a substantial federal policy is at
stake. The court correctly opted in favor of the individual's vital right
against self-incrimination. The option is compatible with the continu-
ing policy underlying the right against self-incrimination. Finally, So-
cialist Workers shows a sensitivity to the tension between the state's
need to prosecute criminal conduct and to protect sources of informa-
tion and the strong federal policy to protect an individual's civil rights.
Overall, the three cases are a comforting balance of an individual's
rights against arbitrary governmental action and a government's need
to prosecute criminal activity.
TRIAL
Jury Selection
The issue of the propriety of the voir dire proceedings was raised
in Fietzer v. Ford Motor Co. 207 Fietzer is an unusual case because it is
one of the rare instances where a trial court judgment is reversed due to
fatal flaws in the jury selection procedure. 208 The diversity suit in this
case stemmed from an automobile accident in Wisconsin in 1969. The
206. Id at 644-45.
207. 622 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1980).
208. Id at 284-86. There are two other grounds for reversal as well: First, improper exclusion
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plaintiff, Fietzer, was driving a Mercury Comet manufactured by the
defendant Ford Motor Co. and was struck from behind by a car driven
by the defendant Hilker. The plaintiffs car burst into flames and the
plaintiff sustained burn injuries to 80% of her body. The plaintiff sued
Hilker and Ford. Fietzer alleged that Ford was negligent for the un-
reasonably dangerous design of the fuel tank of the Comet automo-
bile.20 9 The action against Hilker was settled, but the issue of Hilker's
degree of negligence remained important for the purpose of reducing
the amount of Ford's liability since Ford had lost its right to contribu-
tion from Hilker.
At the first trial, the jury found blilker guilty of negligence but
concluded that his negligence was not a cause of the injury to the plain-
tiff.210 The jury decided that the sole cause of the injuries to the plain-
tiff was the defective design of the fuel tank by Ford.21 I Ford appealed.
The circuit court reversed the judgment on the jury verdict, holding
that Hilker's negligence was a cause of the plaintiffs injuries as a mat-
ter of law.21 2 The case was remanded for a new trial limited to the
issue of the comparative negligence of Hilker and Ford.
In the second trial, the jury apportioned the negligence as follows:
15% to Hilker and 85% to Ford. Ford appealed and argued that the
district court committed prejudicial error due to its unreasonable re-
striction of voir dire examination.
21 3
The factual setting was critical to the case. It was presented by the
Seventh Circuit in the following manner:
The trial court chose to conduct voir dire in this case. In addition
to asking the prospective jurors certain stock questions such as name,
age, address, occupation, spouse's occupation, level of education, and
acquaintance with the attorneys involved in the case, the extent of
the court's interrogation of the jurors was as follows.
1. Would the juror be available for a trial lasting one week or
more?
2. Were any jurors hard of hearing?
3. Did they work for or have close dealings with Ford?
4. Whether the juror had had a claim for personal injuries either as
the result of an automobile accident or any other kind of an inci-
dent?
5. Whether there was any reason whatsoever why the person could
of evidence on the issue of comparative negligence and second, assessment of interest on the
amount of damages. Id. at 286-90. See notes 221-25 infra and accompanying text.
209. 622 F.2d at 283.
210. Id
211. Id
212. Fietzer v. Ford Motor Co., 590 F.2d 215 (7th Cir. 1978).
213. 622 F.2d at 283.
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not sit as a juror and decide the case fairly and impartially based
upon the evidence submitted?
6. Whether any juror worked on a swing shift or the night shift?
Additionally, the parties pursuant to local rules received question-
naires filled out by the jurors. The questionnaires revealed informa-
tion concerning the juror's job, education, health, criminal record,
and vital statistics.
Ford requested the trial court to ask the jurors several additional
questions which focused on the particular facts of the case. Those
included whether any juror had been in a rear-end collision, whether
any juror had been a witness to an accident involving fire, and
whether any juror or member of his or her family had ever suffered
burn injuries, whether any juror or member of his or her family had
been involved in an automobile accident producing injury, whether
any juror ever owned a Mercury Comet and his or her experiences
with it, whether any juror had experience in engineering or automo-
tive maintenance, and whether any juror was employed on a swing
shift. With the exception of the last question, the court refused to
inquire into those areas. The trial court also denied Ford's request to
ask the jurors whether they were aware of a newspaper article which
appeared three days before the trial in The Milwaukee Journal, the
newspaper with the largest circulation in Wisconsin. The article,
which ran on the front page of the paper bearing the headline, "Fuel
Tank Peril Cited in Mavericks, Comets," concerned findings an-
nounced by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration in
regard to fuel tank defects in Comets and Mavericks.
2 14
Although the trial court is given wide discretion in the jury selection
process, the Seventh Circuit found this jury selection procedure too re-
strictive, and therefore, prejudicial to Ford.
21 5
With respect to the examination of prospective jurors, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provide that the court may conduct the exam-
ination but that ". . . the court shall permit the parties or their attor-
neys to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as it deems
proper or shall by itself submit to its prospective jurors such additional
questions of the parties or their attorneys as it deems proper. '21 6 The
Seventh Circuit pointed out that the courts have recognized a right to
"reasonably extensive examination of prospective jurors so that the
parties have a basis for an intelligent exercise of the right to challenge,"
both for cause and peremptory.21 7 Such was not the case here, how-
ever. As the Seventh Circuit wrote:
We believe minimal inquiry into such areas as the juror's or his fam-
ily's involvement in rear-end collisions and collisions that resulted in
214. Id at 285.
215. Id at 286.
216. FED. R. Civ. P. 47(a).
217. 622 F.2d at 284.
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burn injuries, in addition to questions concerning ownership of a
Mercury Comet-all of which go to the nature of the case and the
identity of the parties-was essential to producing disclosure by the
jurors of possible prejudice against Ford.
2 18
Apparently, these failures alone were enough to warrant reversal. Nev-
ertheless, the court went on to address the pre-trial publicity concern as
well:
Additionally, we believe that the better practice in this case could
have been for the trial court to question the jurors about the pre-trial
publicity rather than to ignore it. Specifically, the court should have
asked the jurors if any of them had read or had heard about the
article and, if so, whether anything read or heard stood out in his or
her mind. After determining the juror's degree of exposure to and
interest in the article, the court then would have been able to inquire
whether he or she had formed an opinion about Ford's relative negli-
gence in the case.
2 19
Therefore, the Seventh Circuit concluded that there was no assurance
that prejudice among the prospective jurors would be discovered if
present under the procedure employed by the district court.220 Al-
though the flaws in the jury selection procedure were the basis for re-
versal, the case is not an indication that the Seventh Circuit is likely to
open up voir dire to the former practices in which lawyers tried to con-
dition jurors and to unduly extend voir dire.
Damages
In Fietzer v. Ford Motor Co .,221 the Seventh Circuit also addressed
the issue of whether interest should be assessed on a damage award
from the date of the first trial or from the date of the second trial. The
total amount of damages was determined at the first trial,222 but the
case was reversed on appeal and remanded for a new trial solely as to
the question of the comparative negligence of the defendants Ford Mo-
tor Co. and Hilker, the driver of the vehicle which collided with the
plaintiff's automobile.2 23 The district court reasoned that "since the to-
tal damages were fixed by the first trial and the second trial did not
involve the issue of damages, the damages were liquidated by the first
218. Id at 286.
219. Id
220. Id See United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 367 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 970 (1973), where the test was stated to be not whether members of the jury were in fact
prejudiced, but "whether the procedure used for testing impartiality created a reasonable assur-
ance that prejudice would be discovered if present."
221. 622 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1980).
222. Id at 288. Damages were set at $469,303.19.
223. 622 F.2d at 290. Fietzer v. Ford Motor Co., 590 F.2d 215 (7th Cir. 1978).
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jury verdict. ' 224 Therefore, the district court assessed interest from the
time of the verdict in the first trial, rather than the second. The effect of
this approach was to increase Ford's liability by about $60,000. Ford
appealed, arguing that interest should have been awarded from the
time of the verdict in the second trial, and the Seventh Circuit agreed
with Ford.
225
Cases in Wisconsin had held that interest on damages can be
awarded from the date of the first trial in cases in which the amount of
damages is determined or liquidated as a result of that first trial and are
not subject to change due to later trials. 226 Ford contended that such
was not the case here, because although the total amount of damages
was determined at the first trial, Ford did not know the exact amount of
its liability until the outcome of the second trial, which established the
comparative negligence of Ford and Hilker.227 Ford relied upon a
series of pre-judgment interest cases, with emphasis upon City of Frank-
lin v. Badger Ford Truck Sales.228 In City of Franklin, the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin refused to allow pre-judgment interest against mul-
tiple defendants since prior to judgment the individual defendants
could not have determined the necessary amount of money to tender in
order to avoid the interest. As the Seventh Circuit said:
We believe . . . that the policy underlying those cases should ap-
ply also to this case. It is simply unfair to allow recovery for interest
from the date of the first trial when it was impossible for Ford at that
date to determine the portion of claimed damages for which it would
be liable so that the amount could be tendered and the interest
thereon stopped from accruing.
229
Offer of Settlement
According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68,230 where an offer
224. 622 F.2d at 289.
225. Id at 290.
226. Fehrman v. Smirl, 25 Wis. 2d 645, 131 N.W.2d 314 (1964); Ziedler v. Goelzer, 191 Wis.
378, 211 N.W. 140 (1926).
227. 622 F.2d at 289.
228. 58 Wis. 2d 641, 207 N.W.2d 866 (1973).
229. 622 F.2d at 289-90.
230. FED. R. Ov. P. 68 provides:
At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, aparty deending against a claim
may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allo wjudgment to be taken against himfor the
money orproperty or to the effect specoffed in his offer, with costs then accrued. If within 10
days after the service of the offer the adverse party serves written notice that the offer is
accepted, either party may then file the offer and notice of acceptance together with
proof of service thereof and thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment. An offer not ac-
cepted shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible except in a
proceeding to determine costs. /f theudgmentfinally obtained by the offeree is not more
favorable than the offer the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer.
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of judgment is rejected and the judgment finally obtained is not more
favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after
the offer has been made. The language of the rule appears mandatory
in requiring the offeree to pay costs. Nevertheless, the question which
arose before the Seventh Circuit in August v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 231
was "whether the awarding of costs under Rule 68. . .is mandatory or
discretionary if the final judgment obtained by plaintiff is not more
favorable than the defendant's offer. ' 232 The Seventh Circuit ruled
that the language is discretionary.
The plaintiff, August, after receiving a right to sue letter from the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, filed suit under the fed-
eral Civil Rights Act 233 against the defendant Delta Air Lines, Inc. The
plaintiff asserted that she was dismissed from her employment as a
flight attendant solely because she was black. After discovery had com-
menced, and pursuant to rule 68, Delta made an offer of judgment of
$450 including costs and fees accrued to date.234 August rejected the
offer, and a twenty-five-day bench trial was conducted. Although the
district court found that August had presented some evidence of racial
discrimination, the court held for Delta and ordered each party to bear
its own costs. 235 Delta moved for costs under rule 68, but the motion
was denied. 236 The district judge concluded that a rule 68 offer must be
a reasonable offer made in good faith, that the sum of $450 was un-
likely to have covered even the attorneys' fees incurred by the plaintiff,
and that, therefore, the offer here could have been effective only if the
plaintiff's claim totally lacked merit or if additional factors mitigating
in favor of the defendant were present.
237
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court's reasoning and
The fact that an offer is made but not accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer.
When the liability of one party to another has been determined by verdict or order or
judgment, but the amount or extent of the liability remains to be determined by further
proceedings, the party adjudged liable may make an offer of judgment, which shall have
the same effect as an offer made before trial if it is served within a reasonable time not
less than 10 days prior to the commencement of hearings to determine the amount or
extent of liability.
(emphasis added).
231. 600 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1979), a]J'd, 49 U.S.L.W. 4241 (U.S. Mar. 9, 1981).
232. Id at 699-700.
233. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 (e) to 2000(e)-17. (1976 & 1978
Supp.).
234. Suit was filed in January, 1977, and the offer of judgment was made on May 12, 1977.
600 F.2d at 700.
235. Id
236. Id
237. Id at 700 n.3.
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affirmed. 238 The court pointed out two policy reasons in support of this
result. First, the court noted that to allow minimal or nominal rule 68
offers to suffice would encourage bad faith, routine offers as "cheap
insurance against costs" and that the "useful vitality of Rule 68 would
be damaged. ' 239 Second, because the Civil Rights Act embodies a na-
tional policy of high congressional priority and contains an attorneys'
fees provision to encourage individuals to seek redress for civil rights
violations, the Seventh Circuit would not "permit a technical interpre-
tation of a procedural rule to chill the pursuit of that high objective."
240
Therefore, the court limited its holding to cases under the Civil Rights
Act.
2 4 1
It should be noted that there is very little law on the issue involved
here. Two cases have been cited for the proposition that the language
of rule 68 allows no discretion.2 42 The Seventh Circuit, however, at-
tempted to distinguish those cases. 243 A major concern is that the Sev-
enth Circuit's holding that rule 68 is discretionary seems to cause
overlap with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d),244 which provides
that costs should be allowed to the prevailing party unless the court
directs otherwise.
2 45
238. Id at 700-01.
239. Id. at 701.
240. Id
241. Id. at 702. The court explained:
In a Title VII case the trial judge may exercise his discretion and allow costs under
Rule 68 when, viewed as of the time of the offer along with consideration of the final
outcome of the case, the offer can be seen to have been made in good faith and to have
had some reasonable relationship in amount to the issues, litigation risks, and expenses
anticipated and involved in the case.
Id Reviewing the Seventh Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court held that by reading a reasona-
bleness requirement into rule 68, the circuit court had failed to confront "the threshold question"
of whether rule 68 applies at all in the situation where judgment is rendered for the defendant-
offeror. 48 U.S.L.W. 4241 (U.S. March 9, 1981). The Court held that such a judgment was not
one "obtained by the offeree," so rule 68 had no application to Delta's offer to August. Id. at
4242.
242. Dual v. Cleland, 79 F.R.D. 696 (D.D.C. 1978); Mr. Hanger, Inc. v. Cut Rate Plastic
Hangers, Inc., 63 F.R.D. 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). See also Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 485 F. Supp.
110, 115 n.2 to 116 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 1979), citing August as requiring the offer to be made in good
faith and to be a reasonable amount. At one point Waters states that "Rule 68 allows the court no
discretion..." 485 F. Supp. at 113, but at another point the court states that "Rule 68 is designed
to prevent needless litigation by punishing a party that chooses to reject a reasonable settlement
offer." 485 F. Supp. at 114.
243. The court stated that although the court in Mr. Hanger, Inc. considered the rule
mandatory, the defendant's offer was clearly made in good faith since it afforded the plaintiff
substantially the relief he requested. The Seventh Circuit added that in Dual, the issues of good
faith and reasonableness in the settlement offer were not considered by the court. 600 F.2d at 702.
244. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d) provides in part, "[e]xcept when express provision therefor is made
either in a statute of the United States or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the
prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs .. "
245. The defendant did raise this point in August. 600 F.2d at 701.
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Attorneys' Fees
In Muscare v. Quinn,246 the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff,
Muscare, was entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys' fees on the
successful portion of his civil rights action, but not upon his unsuccess-
ful claim.247 In 1974, Lieutenant Francis Muscare of the Chicago Fire
Department filed suit in federal district court challenging the constitu-
tionality of the Fire Department's regulation which restricted facial
hair. The plaintiff claimed that the regulation was violative of his civil
rights,248 and further alleged that he was denied due process of law by
the disciplinary procedure which resulted in his suspension for twenty-
nine days for violating the regulation. Muscare had not received a
hearing prior to his suspension, but had been offered a post-suspension
hearing, which he declined.
The district court ruled that the regulation was constitutional, but
did not rule on the procedural due process claim.249 An appeal was
taken, and the circuit court reversed the district court. Although the
Seventh Circuit did not decide the constitutionality of the regulation, it
held that there had been a denial of due process. 250 The court found
that Muscare had been entitled to a hearing prior to his suspension. 25'
The United States Supreme Court granted the defendant's petition for
a writ of certiorari, but later dismissed the writ as improvidently
granted. 252 The reasons for the dismissal were that the Supreme Court
had upheld a similar facial hair regulation of a police department
253
and that the Civil Service Commission of the City of Chicago had re-
vised its procedure to provide for pre-suspension hearings in cases such
as the one involving Muscare.
On remand, the district court entered judgment for Muscare on the
due process violation for failure to hold a hearing prior to suspension.
It ordered payment of one month's salary with interest, and took under
advisement Muscare's request for costs and attorneys' fees.254 Muscare
requested $41,012.50 in attorneys' fees (820.25 at $50 per hr.), but the
court denied that amount on the belief that the 820.25 hours claimed
was excessive. The court, however, allowed $50 per hr. for 500 hours
246. 614 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1980).
247. Id at 581.
248. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & 1979 Supp.).
249. 614 F.2d at 578.
250. 520 F.2d 1212 (7th Cir. 1975).
251. id at 1215.
252. 425 U.S. 560 (1976).
253. Kelly v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
254. 614 F.2d at 578-79.
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($25,000) plus $4,935.40 in expenses for a total of $29,935.40.255 After
denial of his motion to reconsider, Muscare filed an appeal from the
district court's order with respect to fees.
The award of attorneys' fees in Muscare is governed by 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988, entitled "Proceedings in Vindication of Civil Rights," and pro-
vides in pertinent part that "the Court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorneys'
fee as part of the costs." The circuit court began its analysis by quoting
from its earlier decision in Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Interna-
tional Harvester, Inc.,256 in which the court rejected a formula based
solely on the hours spent multiplied by the billing rate. As a matter of
fact, the court in Waters had suggested that the formula of hours spent
times the billing rate should constitute only the "starting point from
which adjustments can be made for various other elements. ' ' 257 Ac-
cording to the court, those other elements are the eight factors set out in
the Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Associa-
tion, as factors to consider in determining the reasonableness of an at-
torney's fee:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal
service properly.
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of
the particular employment will preclude other employment by
the lawyer.
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal
services.
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circum-
stances.
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client.
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
performing the services.
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.258
255. id at 579.
256. 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976).
257. Id. at 1322.
258. Id ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DISCIPLINARY RULE 2-106. These
eight enumerated elements are virtually identical to twelve factors established by the Fifth Circuit
in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), and subsequently
approved by the First Circuit for use in attorneys' fees cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976 & 1979
Supp.). King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978). The
twelve factors established in Johnson are as follows:
(1) The time and labor required.
(2) The novelty and difficulty of the questions.
(3) The skill requisite to perform the legal services properly.
(4) The preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of a case.
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The Muscare court then held that ". . . attorneys' fees should only
be awarded on plaintiffs successful claim that he was denied due proc-
ess and not on his unsuccessful claim that the Fire Department's
grooming regulation was unconstitutional. ' 259 Apparently, however,
the Seventh Circuit concluded that the district court had not followed
this principle, 260 for the circuit court reversed and remanded with di-
rection that the district court award a reasonable attorney's fee for the
claim upon which Muscare had prevailed.261 As the Seventh Circuit
wrote, ". . . plaintiff did not prevail on his substantive claim and it
would be an injustice to award him fees for time his attorneys spent
pursuing it.' 262
Another case involving the subject of attorneys' fees is United
States v. D'Andrea.263 There, the Seventh Circuit addressed the ques-
tion of its jurisdiction to review en banc awards of attorneys' fees in
excess of the amount which is ordinarily the limit for services rendered
to court appointed appellate counsel in a criminal case. The Criminal
Justice Act264 governs the award of attorneys' fees to court appointed
counsel and limits compensation to certain maximum amounts ($1,000
in felony cases). The Act, however, permits payment in excess of the
maximum amounts for complex or extended cases "whenever the court
in which the representation was rendered. . . certifies that the amount
of the excess payment is necessary to provide fair compensation and
the payment is approved by the chief judge of the circuit. 265 The Act
is silent on the subject of review of allowances of less than the compen-
sation requested.
In D'Andrea, which was the consolidated appeal of three defend-
ants, one attorney requested compensation of $6,859.23. A circuit
judge acting for the court certified $3,710.23, but the chief judge ap-
(5) The customary fee.
(6) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
(7) Time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances.
(8) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(9) The experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys.
(10) The "undesirability" of the case.
(11) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
(12) Awards in similar cases.
488 F.2d at 717-19.
259. 614 F.2d at 580.
260. See id. at 580-81, where the court pointed out that the substantive constitutional claim
was the main part of the case rather than the procedural issue.
261. Id. at 581.
262. Id.
263. 612 F.2d 1386 (7th Cir. 1980).
264. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1976 & 1977 Supp.).
265. Id. § 3006A(d)(3) (1976).
CIVIL PROCEDURE
proved only $2,210.23. Counsel sought en banc review of the denial of
part of his requested compensation. Relying heavily upon the cases
involving the role of the chief judge in designating three-judge
courtS,
2 6 6 the Seventh Circuit held that it did not have jurisdiction to
review the decision of the chief judge in approving less compensation
than certified by the court and went on to explain the proper procedure
for review of the chief judge's decision:
[Wihen the chief judge of the circuit has approved compensation or
reimbursement less than that amount certified by the court in which
the representation was rendered, counsel may request reconsidera-
tion by motion. However, this motion is addressed solely to the chief
judge. Upon disposition of the request for the chief judge to review
his decision, further review of the chief judge's decision is not avail-
able from this court and any counsel's further remedy lies in a man-
damus action in the United States Supreme Court.
267
Another attorney requested $7,142.73 in compensation. A circuit
judge certified $2,213.70, and the chief judge approved that amount.
The Seventh Circuit concluded that this situation presented a different
jurisdictional setting. The Seventh Circuit concluded that in this cir-
cumstance a petition for rehearing, with or without en banc request, is
appropriate to review the certification of the court as to amount of com-
pensation. The court stated:
The $2,213.70 approved by the chief judge was the amount certified
by this court. Unless the court certified a greater amount, the chief
judge had no power to approve a larger payment, and conceivably
might have done or might do so if the amount certified were in-
creased. The court accordingly does have jurisdiction to reconsider
its certification, although if a greater amount were certified, such cer-
tification would have to be submitted to the chief judge for possible
approval. 2
68
The court, however, concluded that the amount awarded was proper
and denied the petition for reconsideration.
CONCLUSION
Most of the cases chosen for review in this article show a sensitiv-
ity by the Seventh Circuit in balancing competing interests between
individuals and governments, among individuals, or among govern-
ments. The court avoided rigid or artificial application of rules to the
266. Hobson v. Hansen, 256 F. Supp. 18 (D.D.C. 1966); Kirk v. Board of Educ., 236 F. Supp.
1020 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Miller v. Smith, 236 F. Supp. 927 (E.D. Pa.), mandamus refused, 382 U.S.
805 (1965). But see Smith v. Ladner, 260 F. Supp. 918 (S.D. Miss. 1966).
267. 612 F.2d at 1387-88.
268. Id at 1388-89.
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facts and expressed concern for the policies and rationale of the rules.
Furthermore, the court's decisions reflect a realistic and functional ap-
proach to law in modem society. The results protect individual rights
while facilitating government tasks, which is perhaps what one reason-
ably may expect of the courts.
